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SOME LEGAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS
OF SEA WATER INTRUSION-A CASE STUDY OF
GROUND WATER MANAGEMENT*
CHARLES V. MOOREt AND J. HERBERT SNYDERT

The Salinas Valley, an intensively cultivated coastal valley about
130 miles south of San Francisco, is noted for its summer vegetable
production. The moderate climate is ideal for artichoke production
near the coast. The irrigation water supply necessary for intensive
crop production comes from pumping an underground basin recharged by percolation from the Salinas River which flows through
the Valley. Degradation of ground water quality by saltwater intrusion has forced abandonment of wells near the coast.
Two layers of dense heavy clay near the mouth of the Valley
separate the ground water basin in that portion of the Valley into
three strata. The shallowest of these is a perched water table with a
high accumulation of salts from leaching of the surface soil which
renders the water unusable for irrigation. The remaining two, the
180-foot aquifer and the deeper 400-foot aquifer, are connected to
the river at a point 15 to 20 miles from the coast, and are under
artesian pressure. No significant water-bearing strata are apparent
below the 400-foot aquifer. Between the area of recharge of these
aquifers and the coast lies the city of Salinas (see Fig. 1). Offshore
from the Salinas Valley lies one of the largest submarine canyons in
the world. A geological survey of Monterey Bay indicates the presence of silt, sand, and gravel. A gravelly out-cropping located in the
canyon walls is probably the seaward extension of the 180-foot
aquifer; the seaward extension of the 400-foot aquifer has not as yet
been found." Both aquifers are, in all probability, exposed to the
saline waters of Monterey Bay.
* Giannini Foundation Paper No. 302. Research in preparation of this report was
conducted under Project No. RRF 2210 (W-81), University of California and was supported in part by the Water Resources Center, University of California. The authors
appreciate the comments and suggestions of Stephen H. Sosnick on an earlier draft.
t Agricultural Economist, Farm Production Economics Division, Economic Research
Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture.
Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics, University of California,
Davis.

1. Sea-wvater Intrusion in California, 63 Cal. Dep't of Water Resources Bull. 32
(Nov. 1958).
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I
THE PROBLEM

In the late 1930's and early 1940's, water of a high saline content
appeared in wells along the coast pumping from the 180-foot pressure aquifer. Since that time, saltwater intrusion has advanced further and further inland. At present the contaminated area underlies
about 8,000 acres of vegetable producing land. Until the summer of
1959, the amount of saltwater in the 400-foot aquifer was insignificant. However, since that time, three pockets of saline water have
appeared in this aquifer as well (see Fig. 1). This is especially disconcerting since many pumpers, as will be discussed later, have
"solved" their saltwater intrusion problem by shifting from the 180foot aquifer to the 400-foot aquifer.
A brief review of the hydraulics of seawater intrusion will provide
a better understanding of the economic problems involved. Before
a ground water basin can be intruded by seawater, two basic conditions are necessary. First, the water bearing materials comprising the
basin must be in hydraulic continuity with the ocean. Second, the
normal seaward gradient of ground water must be reversed, or at
least be so flat that the greater density of the seawater cannot be
counteracted. 2 The first of these two conditions occurs in the Salinas
Valley, at least for the 180-foot aquifer and, in all probability, for
the 400-foot aquifer as well.
The second condition is met when the pressure head of seawater
exceeds that of the fresh water. This usually results when ground
water levels are lowered to or below sea level by excess pumping. In
the Salinas Valley, this condition is complicated by the fact that both
aquifers are under pressure. To explain the question at hand, it is
best to use the analogy of a water pipe. Ground water moving in the
two confined aquifers under normal conditions enters the pipe at the
landward end and the hydraulic gradient is such that the general
movement is toward the sea. As pumping occurs along the pipe,
water is extracted reducing the amount of water in the pipe and the
hydraulic gradient. If the amount of this pumping is excessive or the
pipe is constricted at some point reducing the flow of water, the
gradient at the lower end is reduced or even reversed, and the second
condition is met.
Fresh water is lighter than seawater. Therefore, when the two
come in contact within a permeable formation-an aquifer-the
tendency is for the fresh water to float to the top. The restrictions
of the permeable formation impede the mixing and diffusion of the
2. Id. at 15.
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two liquids. Following Archimedes law, the seawater forms a wedge
moving through the aquifer-our pipe-with the point of the wedge
at the bottom pointing landward. This latter condition will become
very important when we examine possible cropping adjustments under these conditions.
In 1945, California conducted an investigation of the ground
water basin of the Salinas Valley.' At that time it was estimated that
FIG. 1
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3. Salinas Basin Investigation, 52 Cal. Dep't of Pub. Works Bull. (1946).
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the average annual inflow of saltwater during the previous 15 years
approximated 6,000 acre-feet, all of this intrusion occurring in the
180-foot aquifer. A second investigation by the state in 1954 set the
seasonal overdraft of the 81,000-acre pressure area at 20,000 acrefeet. This included 12,000 acre-feet of seawater 4intrusion and 8,000
acre-feet of induced flow from the recharge area.
A dam was built in 1957 on one of the tributaries of the Salinas
River to store winter runoff for summer recharge of the ground
water basin. This dam, located above the recharge point of the pressure area, helps to keep the fresh water gradient in our pipe analogy
high by maintaining the underground water table high in the recharge area. This structure, built by local funds, has helped minimize
the seasonal and secular changes in the free ground water table in
the Valley, although the saltwater contaminated area has continued
to increase.
A second dam on another tributary has now been constructed also
for the purpose of regulating winter runoff for summer recharge of
the ground water basin. Since the second dam commenced operations
the rainfall and runoff have been about normal, and it is perhaps
significant that during the 1965-1966 water year no further increase
was found in the area contaminated by seawater.'
The existence of the 400-foot aquifer provided pumpers with at
least a short-run alternative source of water, since draft on the 400foot aquifer was substituted for draft on the 180-foot aquifer with
no significant increase in the pumping lift. This has also aided in reducing the rate of intrusion in the 180-foot aquifer. However, in the
summer of 1959, saltwater was found in a well near the coast tapping
the 400-foot aquifer. At present the area of contamination of the
deep aquifer underlies approximately 500 acres. A "blind alley" solution is now appearing for some pumpers since the area of contamination of the two aquifers coincides in the vertical plane and no direct
alternative source of ground water exists for the area where the 400foot aquifer is contaminated.
Cropping adjustments to saltwater intrusion are not practicable.
As indicated earlier, saltwater moves in the aquifer in the form of
a wedge with little mixing and diffusion of the two bodies of water.
Since the buildup of salt water in the aquifer at the site of pumping
is not gradual, no adjustment can be made in the cropping pattern to
minimize the impact of seawater intrusion. Once the seawater wedge
4. D. Ditwiler, The Political Economy of Water Use Transfer and Integrated
Water Resource Management in the Salinas Valley, California 93 (1966). (unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, University of California).
5. On the other hand, however, we should note that individual pumpers have experienced degradation during 1967.
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hits the well casing the salt content of the water rises rapidly, often
within a period of a few weeks or even days. Well tests have been
observed that show the chloride content in parts per million jumping
from a normal for the area of about 100 ppm to over 1,000 ppm
within a growing season.6 Intrusion becomes a discrete variable in
the planning of individual farm production.
Agriculture is the major water user in the Valley and in the pressure area. The estimated consumptive use for irrigation in the confined area in 1963 was 139,240 acre-feet. 7 Most of this water is
pumped during the summer months, causing the reverse hydraulic
gradient to be greatest in the month of August. As the pumping exceeds the recharge, a depression is formed with an axis parallel to
the coast. During the summer months, the axis of this trough deepens
and moves landward increasing the reverse gradient from the sea.
Urban and industrial use is also concentrated primarily in the confined area. Ditwiler estimated that 70 percent of the Valley's urban
population lives in this area. The major center of urban water use
is in the city of Salinas, with an estimated withdrawal of 12,500
acre-feet.' Urban and industrial users withdraw water from both
the 180- and 400-foot aquifers.
The two storage dams on the Salinas River have added "new"
water to the Valley's water balance sheet and in the aggregate there
is an adequate amount of water to supply the needs for many years
in the future. However, this does not reflect locational imbalances of
the various subareas of the Valley. The 1955 state investigation
indicated a safe yield for the pressure area of only 78,400 acre-feet,
whereas the estimated withdrawals are 141,740 acre-feet. The balance then must come from artificial recharge of stored water being
percolated into the upper end of our pipe.
Lateral water movement through a permeable material is very
slow. Although no investigation has ever been conducted to estimate
the transmissibility of this particular aquifer, on the basis of investigations in other areas, it would not be unreasonable to assume that
two to three years would be required for a particle of water to move
from the recharge area to the area along the coast."
6. Chloride ion concentrations of less than 175 ppm are considered good quality,
175-350 ppm is class II, and above 350 is injurious and unsatisfactory for irrigation according to the California Department of Water Resources.
7. Based on data from H. Blaney & P. Ewing, Irrigation Practices and Consumptive Use in Salinas Valley, USDA, SCS (1946). Adjusted for increase in developed land.
8. Ditwiler, supra note 4, at 137.
9. V. Chow, Handbook of Applied Hydrology, ch. 13 (1946).
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II
ECONOMIC ASPECTS

Kneese defines technological external diseconomies as such, "that
the costs of a particular course of action, which may be in the form
of an actual outlay, a reduction in income or satisfaction, or even
completely foregone opportunities, are born by an economic decision
unit which is managerially independent from the one pursuing the
course of action."' 10
In the Salinas Valley situation, a large number of independent
units, including agricultural, municipal, and industrial use groups,
follow independent courses of action regarding pumping water
from the confined area. Although managerially independent, they
are linked technologically because the underground basin links their
physical production units. Thus, while the individual decision to
pump water by one unit does not have a profound effect on other
units, collectively there is an effect.
In terms of private costs and benefits as opposed to the benefits
and costs to society (in this instance, defined as that part of society
composed of all pumpers in the confined area) the private cost to
the individual does not reflect the additional cost in terms of alternative sources of water or income of pumpers foregone in the saltwater intrusion area. Thus, we contend that costs to those pumpers
in the uncontaminated area are actually understated and, therefore,
implies an excess use of the water resource by them. By the same
token, the pumpers in the contaminated area have an excessively high
cost to bear implying, prima facie, a less than optimal allocation of
production for the area.
III
LEGAL ASPECTS

Traditionally, residents of the study area refer to the underground water in the Valley as a flowing underground stream. The
California Water Code states that a subterranean watercourse must
be flowing through a known and defined channel." It further goes on
to say that if the channel through which ground water is moving is
not defined and known, the presumption is that the water is percolating, and finally, the burden of proof is placed upon the plaintiff.' 2
10.
sources
11.
12.

A. Kneese, The Economics of Regional Water Quality Management, in Refor the Future 41 (1964-).
Cal. Water Code §§ 1200, 2500 (West 1956).
W. Hutchins, The California Law of Water Rights 419 (1956).
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Up to the present time, the question of whether the underground
water in the Salinas Valley is or is not a subterranean watercourse
has never been tested in a court of law. Further, the difficulties of
trying to prove that water moving along a five-mile-wide valley floor
is, in fact, a definite stream appear to be almost insurmountable.
Therefore, we must assume that the laws governing percolating waters in an underground basin will apply here.
The doctrine of correlative rights of use in percolating waters,
which has been in effect in California since early in the present century, accords to each owner of land overlying a common water supply, a right to the reasonable beneficial use of the water of that
supply on or in connection with his underlying land, such right of use
of each such land owner being correlative with the similar rights of
all other land owners overlying the same ground water supply. In
the event of insufficiency of the supply for the requirements of the
overlying land owners, the water may be apportioned by court decree. 13 Further, the owner of overlying land who first begins to use
the percolating water gains no priority in the use of the water. 4
The California courts have been reluctant to grant relief when
the damage to the injured party is not substantial. In Peabody v.
Vallejo, the court held that the mere inconvenience, or even the matter of extra expense, within limits which are not unreasonable, will
not avail to prevent a subsequent appropriator from utilizing his
rights. 5 It would appear that pumpers in the area of contamination
of the 180-foot aquifer would not find relief in the courts for the
additional cost of drilling deeper wells into the 400-foot aquifer for
irrigation water. However, legal redress for the land owners overlying the area where both the 180-foot and 400-foot aquifers are
contaminated appears possible.
Ever since the famous Raymond Basin case,' 6 there has been no
question as to the right of tile courts to apportion an insufficient
water supply for the purpose of protecting the supply and preventing
a permanent undue lowering of the water table. In the Salinas Valley, undue lowering of the water table is not the problem. The problem is protection of a water supply. One possible solution to the
seawater contamination problem is to request the courts to apportion ground water pumping in the confined area to maintain a fresh
13. Id. at 431.
14. Id. at 438.
15. 2 Cal. 2d 351, 376, 40 P.2d 486, 496 (1935).
16. Pasadena v. Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 207 P.2d 46 (1949). See also Snyder,
The California Court Reference Procedure-Economics and Law in the Allocation of
Ground Water, 32 Land Economics 286 (Nov. 1957).
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water gradient sufficient to repulse the saltwater in one or both of
the aquifers.
Several problems inherent in this course of action should be considered before initiating a legal solution. First, it will be difficult to
define the ground water basin accurately. The impervious clay strata
are not uniform in thickness or location, and there would be a great
deal of difficulty in defining precise boundaries. The cost of solving
this problem would be formidable. Secondly, the plaintiffs in such a
case would have to prove that both aquifers had a direct connection
to the sea and that contamination of the 400-foot aquifer did not
come from improperly drilled wells allowing saline water to enter
from either the 180-foot aquifer or the perched water table near the
surface. Thirdly, there are the practical difficulties of getting joint
action by the several affected land owners. Finally, the great cost of
a long, drawn-out court case cannot be ignored. In the last instance,
the mere threat of legal action may in fact be sufficient to make an
alternative solution more attractive.
IV
INSTITUTIONAL SETTING

Kneese has succinctly pointed out the analytical advantages of
viewing the technological interrelationships of users within the context of a river basin decision-making unit rather than attempting to
allocate joint costs and benefits between individual decision-making
units. 7 In an operational sense, this internalization is not easily accomplished. Fortunately, both for analytical and operational convenience, there exists in the Salinas Valley an institution that serves
this purpose well. The Monterey County Flood Control and Water
Conservation District is an institution which is capable at least in
a limited way of internalizing these externalities through its taxing
power and water management program.' 8 This does not imply equivalence to a monopoly firm in control of all the Valley's resources, but
rather an intermediate stage institution with a large degree of control of the water supply.
The District was formed in 1947 for the stated purpose of flood
control, water conservation (by spreading, storing, or causing waters to percolate into the soil), prevention of waste, and protection
of the water supply. Specific zones of benefit for purposes of collecting reimbursement of costs of various localized projects have been
formed in the County and Valley. Projects undertaken for the bene17. Kneese, supra note 10, at 48.
18. Ditwiler, supra note 4, at ch. 7.

JULY 1969]

GROUND WATER MANAGEMENT

fit of the entire County are financed by ad valorem assessments on
all property. Projects undertaken for one of the special benefit zones
are financed by ad valorem assessments on either all property or all
real property in the zone.
Comprehensive water management is possible and probably encouraged under such an institutional arrangement. To a limited extent, external technical diseconomies in the district or within a prior
established zone can be internalized. However, this cannot be done
merely by administrative decree. Prior to 1963 a two-thirds majority
of the registered voters was required in the district or a zone to authorize issuance of general obligation bonds and since that time a
simple majority is needed for this purpose.
There is at least the implied obligation of the District (as managed by the County Board of Supervisors) to propose projects and
set a water management policy which, within the limits of its enabling legislation, ceteris paribus,maximizes the economic product to
the County with respect to water use.
V
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

Detailed analysis of all the possible alternative solutions to the
saltwater intrusion problem is not an objective of this paper. This is
not out of lack of interest but because detailed engineering and cost
estimates are not available. A partial listing, however, is illuminating
as it provides some perspective to the analytical framework developed later.
The first alternative is the one alluded to earlier, namely an overall reduction of pumping in the confined area. Although this remedy
has the advantage of simplicity of concept, the problems of implementation loom rather large.
It can be argued that if pumping in the area along the coast did
not cause a saltwater intrusion problem prior to 1940, then an overall reduction in withdrawals back to the annual rates of the 1920's
and 30's should reduce the summer reverse gradient to a point where
the intrusion would be stopped or even reversed. If there was no
alternative source of irrigation water for the area or if the voters
of the district or zone were unwilling to incur the bonded indebtedness to bring in additional water, then this alternative could become
the actual situation. The legal problems mentioned earlier would
still have to be surmounted.
A second alternative, and one very similar to the first, is to reduce
pumping only in the area where the 180-foot aquifer is contam-
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inated. Since all irrigation wells in this area are now tapping the 400foot aquifer, a reduction in withdrawals to the safe yield level from
this aquifer would protect it from any further contamination. Because this area is much smaller than the one contemplated in the first
alternative, a voluntary agreement among the relatively small number of land owners affected may be possible. If a voluntary agreement could not be reached, resort to the courts could be had.
However, the legal problems applicable to alternative number one
would also apply to this proposed solution.
A third possibiity would be a radical departure from tradition in
solving saltwater intrusion problems. This solution involves sinking
a series of wells at the margin of the coastline that would pump from
the contaminated aquifer. Pumping would create a cone of depression causing the hydraulic gradient to the aquifer to reverse. Lowering the pressure gradient at the coast line would change the gradient
so that even if the fresh water level was below sea level, the gradient
under the cultivated area would always be toward the ocean. This
would allow fresh water to continue to move to seaward and, in time,
hopefully the salt in the aquifer would be flushed out and again the
aquifer would become productive.
Although relatively simple in concept, the physical problems inherent in this solution may present formidable obstacles. The most
serious problem is associated with the size of the Valley mouth
where the aquifers come in contact with the ocean. Typical of all
alluvial valley fills, the Salinas Valley is much wider at the mouth
than at any other place. In this instance, the potential interface between the ocean and the aquifer extends across the entire mouth of
the Valley. Although the aquifers have not been contaminated across
the entire mouth of the Valley, the confined area does include about
12 miles of coast line. To reverse the direction of flow at the coast
line would require a sufficient number of wells and pumps to create
a zone of depressions some 12 miles in length. Because of this, the
reverse pressure solution was rejected as infeasible in an earlier state
study of the problem.19 However, based on the results of a small
pilot study in southern California, the State Department of Water
Resources is again seriously looking at this alternative.
A fourth alternative would add water to the contaminated area
and thus is in essence the exact opposite of the last alternative discussed. This alternative calls for injection wells sunk along the coast
line to pump fresh water into the aquifer at this point. This would
build a mound of pressure between the cultivated area and the sea,
19. Seawater Intrusion,supra note 1, at 81.
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using fresh water. By building up the fresh water hydraulic pressure
at the seacoast, further intrusion could be stopped.
This alternative would not only require a large number of pumps
along the coast line but would also require a sizeable amount of fresh
water delivered to these wells for injection purposes. Further, there
has been some difficulty encountered (with injection wells) in other
areas with the problem of sediment and algae in the fresh water,
building up and partially closing the perforations in the injection
well casings. Therefore, this alternative requires an effective and expensive filtering process for the fresh water before it can be injected
into the aquifer. A further problem is that a large amount of salt
water may become trapped between the fresh water barrier and the
fresh water moving down the aquifer leaving a large area still contaminated.
A fifth possible solution to the problem calls for a fresh water
canal to the area of contamination. Controlled releases into the river
from the two storage dams would provide a flow of water which
would in turn be lifted into a canal several miles above the service
area creating sufficient head for gravity flow to the service area. A
storage reservoir would be constructed in the foothills near the service area to maintain the flow during the peak summer irrigation season. Assuming that contamination will continue to increase in the
400-foot aquifer, this system will have to be capable of providing a
full irrigation supply to the area rather than a smaller capacity supplemental supply system. Some preliminary designs and cost estimates have been made for this alternative which could provide water
to farm headgates at about $8.00 per acre-foot. These estimates are
based on a service area somewhat larger than the area where the
180-foot aquifer is presently contaminated thus bringing in the additional problem of economies of scale in project designs.
A purely economic solution to the problem is presented as the
sixth possibility. Compensation might be paid to the damaged or injured land owners by pumpers outside the contaminated area. Since
a solution within this framework involves all of the practical and
legal problems discussed in the first five alternatives, they will not
be repeated here.
The possibility of doing nothing to repel the saltwater intrusion is
a seventh alternative. The best alternative may be that of allowing
the saltwater wedge to continue its advance and allow the land overlying both contaminated aquifers to go idle. In other words, is the
problem so small that it is not worth solving? If the answer to the
last question is yes, then analyses of the previous six alternatives
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would merely be an interesting academic exercise. Therefore, let us
look at the relative magnitudes involved.
The gross area of the contaminated 180-foot aquifer is about
8,000 acres of land or 7,350 acres of cropland (4.9 percent of the
Valley's total). The area covered by contamination of the 400-foot
aquifer is only about 500 acres, centered in the artichoke-producing
area. That is, at present only 500 acres have no underlying fresh
water supply.
To evaluate this problem, two questions must be asked. First,
what would be the impact on the economy of the Valley if the intrusion problem is not solved; and second, what is the average annual
cost of solving the problem? One estimate of the latter is available
although it may not prove to be the most efficient solution. The
Flood Control District has estimated the cost of a fresh water canal
at about $128,000 per year ( 16,000 acre-feet of water at an average
cost of $8.00 per acre-foot). The answer to the first question is not
so easily attained.
If the contaminated area in both aquifers went idle, much of this
production would certainly shift to other lands in the Valley replacing lower-value crops already being grown. Resources invested in the
contaminated area such as labor and capital would find employment
elsewhere although there would be a time lag and an opportunity
cost attached. Aggregate purchases of labor, fertilizer, electricity,
seed, pesticides, etc., would probably be diminished.
Some estimate of the magnitude can be made by utilizing the
results of a California interindustry analysis. Martin and Carter
report the following technical coefficients for the northern California
vegetable industry (Table 1 ).o2 These data indicate the direct purchases, ignoring interdependencies, of the northern California vegetable industry from other sectors.
These technical coefficients can be interpreted as the proportion of
each dollar of gross income received by a vegetable grower that is
paid to other sectors of the economy. Most of the definitions are
self-explanatory. However, the household sector warrants some explanation. Household includes wages, salaries, proprietor's income,
depreciation on capital inputs, and interest charges. This is by far
the largest item, indicating that $0.7449 out of every dollar of producers' income was allocated to this sector.
The absolute expenditure by producers to each sector can be estimated by multiplying the data in column 1 of Table 1 times the
20. W. Martin & H. Carter, A California Interindustry Analysis Emphasizing
Agriculture 250 (Gianinni Foundation Research Report, University of California, Feb.
1962).
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TABLE 1
SELECTED TECHNICAL COEFFICIENTS FOR NORTHERN CALIFORNIA
VEGETABLE INDUSTRY

1954

Proportion

Sector purchased from:
Vegetable industry
.0131
Miscellaneous agriculture
.0332
Chemicals and fertilizer
.0176
Petroleum
.0082
Fabricated metals
.0155
Utilities
.0029
Selected services
.0066
Trade and transport
.0443
Maintenance and construction
.0083
State and local government
.0201
Households
.7449
Source: Martin and Carter, Appendix Table II.

Artichoke value
(500 acres)
(dollars)
3,936
9,976
5,289
2,464
4,658
871
1,983
13,312
2,494
6,040
223,842

gross income to producers. The average gross income per acre of
artichokes for 1966 in Monterey County was $601,"1 or $300,500
for the 500 acres without fresh underground water. Lack of data
precludes estimating the proportion of purchases from other sectors
that would be lost to the economy if this land were to be abandoned.
However, if only half of these expenditures were lost, this would
still exceed the annual cost of a fresh water canal. The annual fresh
water canal cost of $128,000 is 42.5 percent of the payments from
the vegetable sector on 500 acres of artichoke land.22
We therefore conclude that the impact on the economy of the
Salinas Valley would be sufficiently great to warrant a solution of the
intrusion problem. Further, as the contamination spreads it will become more difficult to reinvest the idle resources. Time will become
increasingly important. Having concluded that at least one of the
alternatives appears economically feasible we will move directly
into the general economic framework that permits an analysis of the
remaining alternatives.
VI
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
At least two welfare economics criteria are available which appear
to be applicable in this case. The first, and more restrictive, is the
21. Monterey County, California, Agricultural Commissioner's Report, Monterey
County Annual Crop Report 2 (1966).
22. For general vegetable land, a comparable figure would be $900 per acre or
about $450,000 for 500 acres or less than 30 percent of the payments.
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criterion developed by Pareto (as discussed by Little)2 3 which
simply states that any change which harms no one and which makes
some people better off must be considered an improvement. This
criterion restricts our evaluation to solutions which are upwards and
to the right, i.e., northeast, of the status quo position in a utility
space.
The second and somewhat less restrictive criterion is generally
referred to as the Kaldor-Hicks criterion.24 Stated in its simplest
terms, this criterion says a change is an improvement if those who
gain evaluate their gains at a higher figure than the value which
losers set upon their losses. This criterion allows evaluation of
changes that fall outside of the area amenable to the Pareto
criterion.
For simplicity of presentation, let us assume that for those pumpers in the pressure area but not in the contaminated portion taken as
a unit there exists an aggregate profit function which includes the
cost and quantity of water used. Let this unit be called Group I.
Secondly, the remaining pumpers, i.e., those in the contaminated
area, also have a profit function and are called Group II. Further,
we can locate the coordinates of these two profit functions in a profit
space and show the changes in them due to changes in the cost and
supply of water, ceteris paribus (Fig. 2).
Assume that point A represents profit level coordinates under
water cost and supply conditions as they existed prior to seawater
intrusion. Point B would then represent the present situation. This
change indicates that the level of aggregate profits of Group I have
not diminished due to the intrusion, whereas the profit level of
Group II has dropped sharply due to having to drill more expensive
wells into the 400-foot aquifer. It should be noted that contamination of the 400-foot aquifer would result in a change to point D. At
point D, the profit level of Group I would remain unchanged, while
the profit level of Group II would be reduced to zero since the
latter's supply of irrigation water would be eliminated. Having assumed that a change from point A to point B is the difference due
to pumping from the deeper aquifer, then the distance A-B should
correspond to the increase in cost for Group II due to the more
expensive wells.
We previously assumed that the profit coordinates prior to contamination were point A which indicates profit levels were highest
at that time. However, this point can never be reachieved and,
therefore, the logical benchmark becomes point B which represents
23. I. Little, Welfare Economics, ch. VI (1958).
24. Id.
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the present or status quo position. Any change to the left and below
point B reflects a decrease in profit (and supposedly utility as well),
for the study area. In analyzing any of the possible alternative solutions described earlier, we would, according to either the Pareto or
Kaldor-Hicks criterion, move as far to the northeast from point B
as possible. Let us look at the alternative solutions within this framework.
Alternative 1 involved the use of the courts to adjudicate the
pumping basin which would force a reduction in the level of withdrawals of all pumpers in the confined area to a level commensurate
with the safe yield of the basin. This would reduce the water supply
of both groups, causing both to be worse off than they were at point
FIG. 2.
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B. The result would be a reduction in utility and a change to some
point C. The vertical distance between points B and C (B-F) would
represent the decrease in profits (utility) due to a smaller water
supply to pumpers in the uncontaminated area (Group I). As indicated earlier, the legal problems of this alternative present a serious
and realistic barrier. However, the potential threat of this alternative might be a potent weapon for the land owners in the intrusion
area as the subsequent discussion will illustrate.
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Alternative 2, which involves Group II pumpers voluntarily reducing their withdrawals to the safe yield of the 400-foot aquifer,
would cause a change from the present point B to a point such as
point E, which is to the left and in the same horizontal plane as
point B. This indicates at least a short-run decrease in profits
(utility) for Group II with no change in the level of profits of the
pumpers in Group I. Therefore, there would be a short-run decrease
in the output and profits in the affected area. Further, there would
be no way, under present conditions, in which Group II could prevent members of Group I from tapping the 400-foot aquifer in the
future thus nullifying any long-run gains from this action. In terms
of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, this change from B to D would be
unacceptable in that one group incurred no gain and the other group
was worse off after the change.
Alternatives 3 and 4 can be considered together within our framework since the level of benefits for each should be nearly the same if
they are operating properly. The only necessary criterion for choosing between them would be the lowest average annual costs levels.
The physical feasibility of these two alternatives has yet to be
shown. However, it can be noted that if, after construction of one of
these two barrier systems, it is possible to flush out the saltwater
from the two aquifers and they become completely productive again,
this would create a change in a northeasterly direction. If it were
not possible to flush out that portion of the aquifer now contaminated, the only beneficiaries would be those pumpers in Group I
presently in the pathway of the intrusion wedge. By halting the
progress of the wedge, these pumpers can maintain their present
rate of withdrawals, and the pressure area as a whole could result in
a point somewhere to the left and below point B due to the costs of
building and operating the barrier. If the 180-foot aquifer could not
be cleansed and the barriers did not include the 400-foot aquifer,
Group II would not be any better off than they are at present.
It is possible to analyze alternatives 5 and 6 together because
there are some preliminary cost estimates available for the fresh
water canal system (alternative 5).
To reiterate, we look for a solution that will move the pumpers
from point B to some point above and to the right on the diagram.
To bring our analysis into proper perspective, we must include the
variable of property rights described under alternative number 1
and the cost of making the change. In that discussion, it was indicated that the State Water Code provides for adjudication of
ground water basins to protect and preserve the basin. Recourse to
this alternative would cause a change to point C and would make
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Group I worse off. If it were not for the threat of this alternative,
there would be no reason for Group I to have any concern for the
welfare of Group II. Recourse to this alternative has Group I as a
defendant in the court action and has a bearing on the cost sharing
of alternative number 5 or the payers of compensation to Group II
in alternative number 6.
The argument goes as follows: If Group II was successful in their
court action to reduce the withdrawals of the basin to the safe yield,
Group I would be worse off by the amount corresponding to the vertical distance between point B and point F. Therefore, they could
afford either to pay as compensation to Group II this amount to
maintain their present rate of withdrawals or contribute up to this
same amount as their share of the costs of a fresh water canal which
would bring the entire study area to a point east of B (let's call
this point G), due to an increase in the aggregate supply of water.
Since there would be a benefit accrued to Group II by the amount
represented by the horizontal distance between B and C, they could
contribute the amount represented by the line F-C, in lieu of the costs
of the court action previously described. If the costs represented by
the length of the two line segments B-F plus F-C are greater than
the average total cost of delivering fresh water from a canal to the
contaminated area, then the problem arises as to how the costs
should be shared.
One way to divide the costs of the supplemental water would be
on the basis of the relative lengths of the two line segments. We do
not have before us detailed estimates of the aggregate profit levels
for each group. The diagram is useful in its explanatory value and
not in its quantitative ability; therefore, a more practical approach
offers more appeal.
The second approach would be to levy a charge for canal water
that did not exceed the average cost per acre-foot in the intrusion
area prior to the contamination when Group II was pumping from
the 180-foot aquifer. From an earlier cost study in the Valley, an
estimate of about $5.00 per acre-foot was made. 5 A charge of $5.00
per acre-foot for canal water delivered to the farm headgates in the
service area would make Group II as well off as they were prior to
contamination and the balance of $3.00 per acre-foot collected from
Group I would make them better off than they would be at point C
and almost as well off as they were at point A. Using point F as a
benchmark due to the interjection of property rights, the Pareto
criterion can be applied because both groups have gained from the
25. Moore & Snyder, Pump Irrigation Cost Increases in the Salinas Valley, 19 Cal.
Agriculture 14 (Aug. 1965).
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change. If point B is used as a benchmark, the Kaldor-Hicks criterion must be applied because point G is below the horizontal plane
of point B. In the latter case, the gains of Group II are greater than
the losses of Group I at point G even when the net cost of the change
is taken into consideration. Therefore, depending upon which point
is taken as a benchmark, the change is considered acceptable under
both criteria.
The question still arises as to how to collect the compensation or
Group I's share of the cost of the fresh water canal. The Flood
Control District, described earlier, stands as an excellent mechanism
for internalizing these external diseconomies. It would be a relatively
simple matter to define a zone of benefit that included only the pressure area. A bond issue floated for the purpose of constructing the
fresh water canal could be repaid by a tax on the assessed valuation
of the property within the prescribed zone. An amount could be
collected that caused Group I to pay about $3.00 per acre-foot for
anticipated project deliveries to the project service area. Those
pumpers within the canal service area but not in the contaminated
area would be no worse off by paying this amount.
Collecting a tax on the Group I pumpers to be used for paying
compensation would be much more difficult in that the constitution of
the District would have to be changed to allow for a tax that is not
collected to repay a bond issue. There would also be the problem of
how to divide any taxes collected among the Group II pumpers. If
the tax was collected but not paid to the Group II pumpers, there
would still be a misallocation of resources as has been shown by Turvey; 26 and the Group II pumpers would be only slightly better off
than they are at present, since it is doubtful that a tax of this magnitude would cause pumpers of Group I to reduce their withdrawals to
the level of safe yield of the basin. Therefore, the cost-sharing alternative would appear more appealing in that it avoids this complication.
CONCLUSION
This paper has described some of the physical characteristics of
saltwater intrusion into a ground water basin. The major focus has
been to define and evaluate legal and economic problems that might
be encountered in applying any of six major alternative solutions to
the intrusion problem considered feasible at this point of development. When these alternatives are analyzed within both the frame26. R. Turvey, On Divergences Betveen Social Cost and Private Cost, Economica
309 (Aug. 1963).
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work of welfare economics and the legal setting of property rights,
the threat of court action by the injured parties causes a change
away from the present status quo solution to one where the pumpers
in the uncontaminated area would be as well off if they contributed to
the cost of a fresh water canal rather than suffer the consequences
of having the courts adjudicate the basin. Secondly, the aggregate
profit level of the entire pressure area would be maximized under
this solution.
A profitable future line of research might be to undertake an
empirical estimation of the quantitative magnitudes involved in
the aggregate profit levels hypothesized in our welfare economics
model including the net cost of the various alternative solutions.

